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MARITIME JURISDICTION

States X and Y are at war. Other States are neutral.
An act of Congress of the United States, February 19,
1895, provided for the delimitation of the high seas from
rivers, harbors, and inland waters. Lines were later
drawn on maps published in accordance with this authorization. .Some of these lines were 10 miles off the coast.
(a) ( 1) The Lark, a vessel of war of X, passes within
these outer lines and when 8 miles off the coast summons
merchant vessels of the United States and of other States
to stop for visit and search. The master of each of these
vessels appeals for protection to the authorities of the
United States on the ground that the vessels are within
the lines drawn under the act of 1895.
(2) The ThJtUs~h, a vessel of war of Y, attacks the Cygnet, a vessel of war of X, on the following day at the same
location, and the commander of the Oygvnet protests on
the ground that his vessel is in neutral waters.
(b) The Oygnert by gunfire drives the Thrush 12 miles
off the coast. The Thrush continues the battle using dangerous gas. Some of this gas floats within 3 miles of the
United States and life there is endangered.
(a) Later the Thrush, still having a large amount of
dangerous gas on board, is about to enter a harbor of the
United States. The port authorities decline to permit
entrance with the gas on board. The commander of the
Thrush protests, as he is short of fuel to continue his voyage to a home port.
1
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vVhat action should the authorities of the United States
take in each case ~
SOLUTION

(a) (1) The right of visit and search beyond the
3-mile limit upon the high sea. is an undeniable belligerent
right and the authorities of the United States can afford
no protection against its lawful exercise.
(2) The protest of the Oygnet is not valid, as these
'vaters are not, for the purposes of neutrality, within the
jurisdiction of the United States.
(b) The authorities of the United States may use, the
means at their disposal to prevent the diffusion of dangerous gas within 3 miles of the coast.
(c) The authorities of the United States may exclude
from its harbors vessels having dangerous gas on board,
or may prescribe. the conditions of entrance thereto for
such vessels.
NOTES

Historical.-The development of a clearly defined law
of maritime jurisdiction has been slow. As the desirH to
control a utility or a presu1ned utility would ordinarily
under lie the exercise of jurisdiction, the attitude toward
maritime jurisdiction would vary with the use of the sea.
It might be possible that there would be no conflict of
jurisdiction between States 'vhen one State used the sea
merely as a source of food supply while another regarded
it as an effective barrier against hostile invasion. The
attitude of States toward jurisdiction, or the exercise of
State authority over the sea has rested upon different
bases. Sometimes the main reasons for the exercise of
authority have been for self-defense, sometimes for economic or other reasons.
In the account of creation in the first chapter of
Genesis, God is represented as saying, " Let us make man
in our image after our likeness ; and let him have do min-
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ion over the fish of the sea." This seems to be a general
injunction to the effect that fish are to be for man. The
problem as to the limits of rights in fish when different
men or groups of men claim the fish still remains unsettled. Man has been given dominion on the earth ; he
has shown himself able to exercise dominion, and there
has been disagreement as to the exercise of this dominion.
The water area of the earth from its very nature is less
subject to permanent control than the land area. The
advantages of permanent control would. not ordinarily
be equal to the effort. In early times this was particularly true of the sea, whicli was unknown and feared.
From the works of ancient writers it is evident that
the sea was often regarded as susceptible of possession
in the same manner as land. There were also early
declarations, as among Roman jurists, that " the use of
the sea is as free to all men as the air." Et quidem
naturali jure communia sunt omnium haec: aer et aqua
profiuens et mare et per hoc litora maris. (Inst. 2, I, 1.)
The claims of the Phmnicians, the Persians, the
Greeks, the Macedonians, and others over the Eastern
l\iediterranean Sea gave rise to many struggles as did
the claims of Carthage and Rome to the mid -Mediterranean. Other rivalries for control of the Mediterranean followed to 'vhich tlie Crusades added importancee
The idea of maritime sovereignty came to be the prevailing one, however, during the Middle Ages. The
prevalence of lawlessness at sea in the form of piracy
and otherwise during the Middle Ages required a strong
hand to suppress. It was natural that a state should
protect its neighboring trade routes, and its own traders,
as well as foreign traders who also would gladly yield
obedience in return for this protection. The commerce
of the Italian state was, during this period, very important. The marriage of the sea celebrated by the city of
Venice from the latter part of the twelfth century was
emblematic of the authority which that city had at the
time over the Adriatic. Venice from time to time
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claimed and exercised the privilege of excluding others
from the use of the Adriatic. The restrictive measures
were usually taken with a view to protecting trade and
commerce in these early days.
The Italian writers even before Bartolus maintained
that cities like Venice and Genoa having ports had jurisdiction and sovereignty in the neighboring sea to 100
miles and even farther i£ it was not near another State.
With the traversing of the great seas by voyages of
discovery and commerce and the opening of the Western
Hemisphere new problems arose. The Portuguese had
cruised along the coast of Africa and to India. Spain
was also striving for maritime power and Columbus discovered America under Spanish patronage. The papal
bull of Alexander VI in 1493 confirmed to Ferdinand
and Isabella all lands found or to be found west. of a
meridian ioo leagues west of the Azores. Spanish maritime power was unable to maintain exclusive control of
the seas. The English, Dutch, and French sought control of the sea.
Even as early as the twelfth century the Black Book
of the Admiralty (1.58) refers to the sea belonging to
the King of England-" lamer appartenant au roi d'Angleterre." Other States also clain1ed extended maritime
jurisdiction and it was inevitable that with the growth
of maritime commerce and the use of the sea conflicts
would arise.
The documents of the late Middle Ages show many conflicting claims to maritime jurisdiction. Not merely 'vere
there conflicting claims but often the attempt to maintain
the claims resulted in the use of force and varied reprisals. Occasionally treaties were made in regard to
the use of the sea, but till modern times treaties and practice showed little tendency toward the recognition of fun··
damental principles of maritime jurisdiction.
Rulers in their titles and proclamations sometimes asserted dominion which was never exercised. Power was
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often exercised arbitrarily because there were no accepted bounds of authority. After the Middle Age period
appeal to precedent and custon1 in support of State acts
became more common. Claims and counter claims fill
n1any pages of royal proclamations and decrees, and of
argumentative treatises. It was not till the seventeenth
century that the questions of maritime jurisdiction in
the modern sense became especially prominent. The
titles, king of the sea, lord of the ocean, successor to N eptune, had been used by different rulers and in varying
sense throughout many centuries and medals had been
struck proclaiming these titles.
Hugo Grotius had prepared in 1604-5 a treatise De
Jure Praedae which vvas in the nature of a brief for
the Dutch East India Co. This ren1ained unknown till
1864 and was published in 1868. Chapter XII of this
brief appeared anonymously in 1608 as Mare Liberum.
It defends the rights of the Dutch as against the Portuguese pretentious particularly in the East Indian waters.
Grotius endeavors by reference to the writers of Greece
and Rome, to the Holy Scriptures and other sources to
maintain that no nation could have exclusive jurisdiction
over the sea and its navigation and trade.
Gentilis seems to have been unduly hopeful when writing in the early seventeenth century he expressed himself
in Hispanicae Advocationis, 1613, Book I, Chapter VIII, De marino territorio tuendo, saying " Fruantur Hollandi,
fruantur mari omnes, sed citra injuriam alienae jurisdictionis. Sed et meminerint omnes, esse et modum marini, atque omnis itineris. Meminerint, alia olim indi~
tincta, quae distincta sunt hodie, et cautissime servandam
distinctionem juris gentium dominiorum atque jurisdictionum." "Let the Dutch enjoy, let all enjoy the use of
the sea, but without violation of another's jurisdiction.
On the other hand ·also let all remember there is likewise
a limit to marine as well as to other journeying. Let
them remen1ber that other things once unsettled are now
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settled and that the demarcation as to dominion and jurisdiction of the law of nations should be most carefully
observed." In this chapter Gentilis also affirms territory
consists both of land and water: "At ego, quod olim
scripsi in libris bellicis, territorium et de terris dici, et de
aquis." In the discussion following this statement Gentilis makes the distinction between territory and jurisdiction and shows that it has been recognized.
Grotius sums up the best opinion of the early days of
the seventeenth century, though not following Gentilis,
saying:
It would seem that dominion over a part of the sea is acquired in the same manner as other dominion ; that is, as said
above, because it appertains to a person or to a territory-as
appertaining to a person when be bas a fleet, which is a sea army,
in that part of the sea; as appertaining to territory in so far as
those who sail in the adjacent part of the sea can _be commanded
from the shore no less than if they were upon land. (De Jure
Belli ac Pacis. Lib. II., c. 3, 13.)

The Mare Liberum of Grotius did not attract immediate attention. Seraphin de Freitas made a. clever reply in
behalf of the Spanish, which was published in 1625.
The Mare Clausum seu de Dominio Maris by John Selden published in 1635 particularly called attention to the
Mare Liberum of Grotius and joined issue with the positions taken by Grotius. Selden endeavors with many
supporting references to prove that the sea may be subjected to the private dominion or ownership as well as the
land and that the sea about Great Britain has always
belonged to Great Britain.
Other pamphlets and books r>n either side of the question appeared. Graswinckel, in an ostensible reply to
Burgus, who in 1641 had defended Genoa's claim to
dominion of the Ligurian Sea, attacked Selden. Graswinckel also replied to Welwod. The 'vorks of Boroughs, Loccenius, Burman, von d~r Reck, Schook,
Boxhorn, and others as well as a translation of Selden's
lVIare Clausum were published about the middle of the

HISTORICAL

7

seventeenth century. Every possible source was cited in
support of opposing points of view. Many of these books
were vitriolic in their references to those whose views were
not in accord with their own. Discussion of maritime
jurisdiction reached its maximum in the seventeenth century and continued active through the first half of the
eighteenth century. More and more with the recognition
of the princjple of equality of states and the development of the idea that the sea was res nullius there was
need of definition of maritime rights.
From the latter part of the seventeenth century the
Roman law, the commentaries, and the classical writers
of Greece and Rome were less the bases upon which
writers rested their arguments. Texts upon the laws of
'var, on the laws of nations and of nature, reference to
practice and detailed treatment of special topics multiplied and had to be considered. The early idea of property in the sea was that of co1nplete dominion, involving
the right to use, to enjoy, or to alienate to the exclusion
of others, usus, fructus, abusus. This is what Plutarch
considers Pompey to have attained in 67 B. C., calling it
"not a sea-command but an out-and-out monarchy and
irresponsible power over all men. For lavv gave him
dominion over the sea this side of the pillars of Hercules." (Plutarch, Pompey XXVI.) The Middle Age
·period generally reaffirined earlier ideas. The revolutionary ideas as to the laws of the seas came in the
seventeenth century, though germs of these ideas can be
found in earlier periods.
Codes of sea la \V for merchants had of necessity gro·wn
up, otherwise commerce would have been impossible.
These codes were not always in accord with local law
but were observed for mutual advantage. As the Law
of Rhodes served merchants in early times so such codes
as the Consolata del Mare served the later ages.
It came to be realized that limits must be set to the
exercise of authority of one state if other states bordered
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upon the same sea. Some admitted that any state,
whether large or small, weak or strong, was entitled to
some authority over the marginal sea. which touched its
coasts. Accordingly if two states were upon opposite
sides of a sea, as Great Britain and Holland on the opposite sides of the North Sea, there must be a line limiting
the extent of the authority of each state. Even Selden,
referring to the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, admits of
that area, "it can not all be called British seas,.; yet "the
nation of Great Britain has very large rights and privileges of their own in both seas " (Mare Clausum, Bk. L
c. 2). Cicero had held that the main body of the sea
should be common to all. This was admitted by some
of the ardent advocates of the mare clausum, while certain supporters of mare liberum· claimed the open sea
extended to the shore. Gradually, with the development and recognition of mutual rights and obligations,
extreme nationalistic claims were found to be of little
advantage or to be of positive disadvantage. Grotius
in 1625 had spoken of jurisdiction of the sea as "ratione
territorii, quatenus ex terra cogi possunt, qui in promixa
maris parte versantur, nee minus quam si in ipsa terra
r eperirentur " (De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Lib. II. c. 3.13).
Bynkershoek at the beginning of the eighteenth century in his De Dominio Maris proposed a formula not
unlike earlier ideas but brief, which -appealed to man's
sense of appropriateness. He declared " potestatem
terrre, finiri, ubi finitur armorium vis." (cap. 2.) "Pronunciamus mare liberum, quod ·non possidetur vel universum possideri nequit, clausam, quod post justam
occupationem navi una pluribusque olim possessum :fuit."
(cap. 7.) This principle set forth by Bynkershoek in
1702 was not ~ new principle. Nearly one hundred years
before the Dutch representative arguing against the
proclamation issued by James I in 1610 in regard to
fishing off the English coast had maintained" 2. For that
it is by the laws of nations, no prince can cliallenge fur-
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ther into the sea than he can command with a cannon
except gulfs within their land ·:from one point to another.
3. For that the boundless and rolling seas are as common
to all people as the air which no prince can prohibit."
The treatise o:f Bynkershoek marks a transition :from
the abstract discussjon o:f the extent o:f authority o:f an
adjacent state over the sea to a concrete basis :for the
authority, namely the ability tn exercise the authority.
Earlier writers had found divine law, natural law, dicta
-o f the classics and of Roman law, practice o:f certain
states, the claims o:f rulers, bases :for their positions;
Bynkershoek reduced his formula to the simple basis
of effectivity. The early writers had approved in some
cases unlimited control, necessity (JVIolloy), the horizon
(Valin), 100 miles (Bartolus), 60 miles (Bodin), 2 days
journey (Loccenius), etc. Bynkershoek's proposition to
limit jurisdiction by the range o:f cannon :from the shore
·was therefore welcomed. The range o:f cannon in the
early eighteenth century being about 3 miles, the marine
league became a commonly accepted limit o:f Inaritime
jurisdiction.
Early in the eighteenth century the claims o:f control
o£ the Indian seas, the routes to America and other wide
ocean areas were for the n1ost part discontinued, but just
how far a state had jurisdiction from its coast was not
settled even though Bynkershoek's :formula was so well
received.
Other theories had from early times been put forward
for control over the sea. The needs of the adj acerrt
State were put forward by Sarpi in support of the
claims of Venice. Scandina vi an claims to extended
control were supported by t he argument that the nature
of their mainland and their dependence upon the sea
required control o:f a large maritime area. The configuration of the coast. had been put forward as a basis :for
authority over the sea. Long exercise of control was
referred to as evidence that control should be continued.
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Treaties, judgments of courts, etc., were put forward to
maintain claims.
During many years there had been growing up a
tendency to differentiate in the exercise of jurisdiction
according to the nature of the end to be secured. Claims
to extended jurisdiction to satisfy national and royal
vanity were, however, often merely empty words.vVhile the Roman law showed uniformity in principles
relating to dominion of water areas, later legislation
showed great diversities. National ideas, ambitions, and
exigencies 'vere reflected in laws. While Roman law
phraseology was sometimes retained, the meaning of the
words was not uniform. Claims were sometimes more
or less extended according to the power of the ruler of
the adjacent territory to enforce his claims. Sometimes
a ruler would fight for abstract claims but usually they
had to Jind an ostensible support in some national advantage such as security from att'ack.
Some of the extreme claims were first waived by allowing navigation or simple passage of vessels along the
coast waters within the area claimed by the State. Salutes by lowering of flag or of sails by foreign vessels
were sometimes required even when navigation ·was otherwise free. It was one of the early claims that the passage of a vessel over the sea leaving only the wake which
soon disappeared was not to be denied by the adjacent
State because it in no way injured the adjacent State.
The wind that filled the sails of the passing ship did not
take away from the breeze that touched the shore.
There might, however, be just claim to fisheries along
the coast or to the salt, minerals, and other deposits upon
the sea bottom adjacent to a State. The fishery rights
in marginal waters were among the earliest to be asserted
and maintained. When fish constituted an important
part of the food supply of Europe, particularly during
the Middle Ages, fishing rights were the bases of many
controversies and the transportation of fish gave rise to
other controversies. Records of the thirteenth century
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show attempts o:f States to control fisheries along their
coasts. Long be:fore the questions o:f jurisdiction were o:f
importance, fisheries were the subject o:f control.
There were many pamphlets put forth during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries supporting or denouncing rights at sea and particularly fishing rights.
The rulers had by laws and decrees, particularly during
the seventeenth century, regulated fishing and trade in
fish. There had been many earlier decrees upon the same
subject but they vvere not so detailed as son1e o:f the
eighteenth century decrees, which even regulated the sale
o:f oysters in the shell. Decrees, ordinances, etc., prescribed for licenses, permits, registration, place of fishing, nationality of cre·w, days of fishing, Sundays and :fast
days, and a French Arret du Conseil d'Etat du 20 Mars
1786, Art. VI, provided favors for, :foreigners who married women of Marseille and also that they " soient
reQus membres de la communaute des pecheurs :fran<;ois
aussitot apres leurdit mariage." These decrees did not,
however, prescribe the limits of the marginal seas, but
only asserted rights in these seas so far as fishing vvas
concerned.
Though much had been written, and treaties had been
made and judgments had been rendered, the questions of
jurisdiction were far from completely settled at the
beginning o:f the nineteenth century. Rayneval in the
pre:face to his work De la Libert~e des Mers in 1811 said,
"L'Ocean seul semble etre abandonne aux caprices des
nations, a l'instabilite ou a l'exageration de leurs vues,
de leurs pretentious et de leur puissance." (P. VII.)
This uncertainty of the law be:fore the nineteenth century was natural owing to the continual opening o:f new
Inaritime areas by exploration and trade which led to
readjustments in ideas as to rights. During the
eighteenth century there had been developing also the
distinction between belligerent and neutral rights at sea.
These rights were somewhat defined by the armed neu44003-29-2
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tralities o£ 1780 ·and 1800 and by the American neutrality
proclamation o£ 1793 and the act o£ Congress o£ 1794.
1t came to be held that a state which took no part in a
war should not be liable to injury and consequently no
act o£ hostility should take place within range £rom the
shore o£ guns on the vessels at sea, which was held to be
3 miles.
In all the discussions, opinions, and writings there was
little difference o£ opinion as to the jurisdiction o£ a
state over the shore itsel£ upon which the sea washed.
The Roman law granted this even to the lowest tide mark.
(Inst. II, 1, 3.) The same principles was introduced in
domestic legislation in different states as in the ordinances o£ France o£ 1534, 15·96, and 1581, " Sera. repute
bord et rivage de lamer tout ce qu'elle couvre et decouvre
pendant les nouvelles et pleines lunes, et jusqu'ou le plus
grand flot de mers se pent etendre sur les greves." In
some states as in England the area between high and
lo-w-water mark was held to be within the jurisdiction
o£ the maritime authorities at high tide and o£ the land
authorities at low tide, but it was rarely denied that the
authorities o£ the adjacent state had jurisdiction to the
low-water mark. This ancient principle seemed at the
beginning o£ the nineteenth century about the only one to
'v hich there might be said to be adherence.
During the nineteenth century there were many attempts by writers o£ great ability to set forth principles
·which would be generally accepted, but the develop1nent
o£ commerce and nationalism introduced new probleme
as had exploration and discovery in earlier periods.
Property on the sea had £rom earliest times been exposed to danger. The forces o£ nature had often destroyed such property with the lives o£ those who accompanied it leaving no trace. The temptation to man to
take property on the sea had been too great to be resisted
apparently even in periods reaching £ar back o£ recorded
history. Pirate communities vied with each other and
their leaders lived in state. In the days o£ Pompey
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pirates controlled the Mediterranean even to the Columns
of Hercules. Pompey in 67 B. C. by the lex Gabinia was
given for 3 years unlimited command of the Mediterranean and for 50 miles along its shores. With this
authority, and within 3 months, he cleared the Mediterranean of pirates. They returned and later rulers
had to repeat the campaigns of Pompey in order that thP
Romans might call the Mediterranean mare nostrum.
Private citizens 'vere sometimes authorized oy a state
to make reprisals upon the citizens or property of the
citizens of another state. Their acts were often very
like those of pirates. Other states demanded tribute at
times which tribute differed very little from the exactions
of pirates. Privateering in the time o:f war added another peril to seafaring life. The attitude of states toward these acts varied and the exercise of control over
the sea varied correspondingly. The slave trade gave
rise to other differences in law and practice among the
so-called civilized states. Impressment upon the sea
continued through the early days of the nineteenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century it
would be possible to find precedents or to cite authorities
for almost any claim a state might wish to make as to
jurisdiction over the sea.
The rapid development of the idea of neutrality in the
nineteenth century following the armed neutralities of
1780 and 1800 introduced new problems. These problems were further complicated by the introduction of
new means and methods of warfare. Three miles became a very short range for cannon and many wished the
range extended.
Eighteenth centu,r y tTeaties.-Almost as soon as there
came to be any agreement upon territorial 'vaters,
treaties were made. The eighteenth century saw the
gradual development of the idea of a marginal sea and
the cannon shot was the basis of measurement.' This
followed the idea of Bynkershoek in 1702 of control as
far as cannon shot could reach.
\
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The treaty between France and Russia o£ January
1787, provided:

11~

ART. 28. In consequence of these principles, the high contracting parties pledge the1nselves reciprocally, in case one of them
makes war against another power, to never attack the vessels of
his enen1y ·within cannon range of the coasts of his ally. They
pledge themselves also to 1nutually observe the most perfect neutrality in the harbors, ports, gulfs, and other waters included in the
name of inclosed waters, which belong to them, respectively.

The treaty between the United States and Great Britain, November 19, 1794, provided:
ART. 25. * * * Neither of the said parties shall permit the
ships or goods belonging to the subjects or citizens of the other,
to be taken within cannon shot of the coast, nor in any of the
bays, port, or rivers of their territories, by ships of war, or others
having commission frmn any prince, republic, or State whatever.
But in case it should so happen, the party whose territorial rights
shall thus have been violated, shall use his utmost endeavors to
obtain from the offending party full and ample satisfaction for the
vessel or vessels so taken, whether the same be vessels of war
or 1nerchant vessels.

Austrian ordinance, 1803.-An ordinance respecting the
observance o:f neutrality issued by Austria, August 7,
1803, also provided :for the gun range:
ART. 11. As all vessels without exception should enjoy the protection that is derived from neutrality and perfect security in all
of the ports, roadsteads, and along the coasts subject to our
dmninion, hostilities by one or more vessels of powers at war will
not be permitted in the said parts or within gun range of the
shore, nor, consequently, any con1bat, pursuit, attack, visit, or seizure of vessels. All our authorities, and particularly the military commanders in seaports, must use especial vigilance to this
end.

Kent's opinion.-Chancellor Kent was inclined in the
early nineteenth century to take a very liberal view o:f
American rights in adjacent waters. He regarded the
principles applied in England, o:f including the waters
between headlands as King's Chambers, as also applicable
to the American coast.
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Considering the great extent of the line of the American
-coasts, we have a right to claim, for fiscal and defensive regulations, a libera,l extension of maritime jurisdiction; and it would
not be unreasonable, as I apprehend, to assume, for domestic
purposes connected with our safety and welfare, the control of
the waters on our coasts, though included within lines. stretching
from quite distant headlands, as, for instance, from Cape Ann to
Cape Cod, and from Nantucket to Montauk Point, and frOin that
point to the capes of the Delaware, and from the south cape of
Florida to the Mississippi. It is certain that our Government
would be disposed to view with some uneasiness and sensibility,
in the case of war between other maritime powers, the use of the
waters of 'Our coasts, far beyond the reach of cannon shot, as
cruising ground for belligerent purposes. * * * It ought, at
least, to be insisted that the extent of the neutral immunity
-should correspond with the clahns maintained by Great Britain
around her own territory, and that no belligerent right should be
exercised within "the chambers formed by headlands, or anywhere at sea 'vithin the distance of 4 leagues, or frmn a . right
line from one headland to an~:her." (Commentaries on American
Law, 14th ed., p. 26.)

"Ala oa1'na" and" Kearsarrge."-In 1864 the problem of
an engagement between two vessels of considerable gun
range arose in consequence of the 'arrival of the Confed-erate steamer Alabaona at Cherbourg. On June 13, 1864,
Mr. Dayton, minister to France, informed Secretary
Seward that he had immediately telegraphed to Captain
Winslow of the United States ship Kearsarge at Flushing
and received reply that Captain Winslow " will be off
Cherbourg about Wednesday." Mr. Dayton also protested against the sojourn of the Alabarma as an unneutral
use of French ports and to Mr. Seward sent the following
information :
1

You will, doubtless, have received, before this, notice of the
arrival of the A.la.bama in the port of Cherbourg, and Iny protest
to this Government against the extension of any accommodations
to this vessel. M. Drouyn de l'I-Iuys yesterday informed me that
they had made up their minds to this course, and he ga~e me a
·c opy of the written directions, given by the minister of marine to
the vice admiral, maritime prefect at Cherbourg, a translation of
which accompanies this dispatch. But he, at the same time, in-
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formed me that the United States ship of war, the Kearsarge, had
appeared off the port of Cherbourg, and there was danger of an
immediate fight between those vessels. That the Alabama professes its entire readiness to meet the Kear$Mge, and he believed
that each would attack the other as soon as they were 3 miles off
the coast. That a sea fight would thus be got up in the face of
France and at a distance from their coast within reach of the
guns used on shipboard in these days. That the distance to which
the neutral right of an adjoining Government extended itself from
the coast was unsettled, and that the reason of the old rules,
which assumed that 3 miles was the outermost reach of a cannon
shot, no longer existed, and that, in a word, a fight on or about
such a distance from their coast wou,ld be offensive tO' the dignity
of France, and they would not permit it. I told him that no other
rule than the 3-mile rule was known or recognized as a principle
of international law; but if a fight were to take place, and we
would lose nothing and risk nothing by its being further off, I
had, of course, no objection. I had no wish to wound the susceptibilities of France by getting up a fight within a distance which
made the cannon shot liable to fall -on her coast. I asked him if
he would put his views and wishes on this question in writing,
and he promised me to do so. I wrote t() Captain Winslow this
morning, and herewith inclose you a copy of my letter. I have
carefully avoided in this communication anything which would
' risk anything by yielding what seemed
tend to make the KearsMge
to me t~ n admitted right. (Diplomatic Correspondence, U. S. 1864,
vol: 3, p. 104.)

The· instructions to the maritime prefect at Cherbourg
mentioned in Mr. Dayton's dispatch were translated as
follows:
\Ve can not pern1it the A!abanta to enter into one of our basins
of the arsenal, that not being indispensab~e to place it in a state
to go again to sea. This vessel can address itself to comn1erce
(commercial accommodations), for the urgent repairs it has need
of to enable it to go out; but the principles of neutrality, recalled
in my circular of the 5th of February, do not permit us to give
to one of the belligerents the means to augment its forces, and
in some sort to rebuild itself: In fine, it is not proper that one
of the belligerents take, without ceasing, our ports, and especially
our arsenals, as a base of their operations, and, so to say, as one
of their own proper ports.
You will observe to the captain of the Alabanta that he has not
been forced to enter into Cherbourg by any accidents of the sea,
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and that he could altogether as well have touched at the ports
of Spain or Portugal, of England, of Belgium, and of Holland.
As to the prisoners made by the Alabmna, and who have been
placed ashore, they are free from the time they have touched our
soil; but they ought not to be delivered up to the Kearsarge,
which is a Federal ship of war. This would be for the Kearsarge
an augmentation of military force, and we can no more permit this
for one of the belligerents than for the other. (Ibid. p. 105.)

To Captain Winslow in the letter mentioned in his dispatch Mr. Dayton said:
This will be delivered to you by my son and assistant secretary
of legation. I have had a conversation this afternoon with Mr.
Drouyn de l'Huys, :Minister of Foreign Affairs. l-Ie says they have
given the Alabama notice that she must leave Cherbourg; but in
the mean time you have come in and are watching the Alabama,
and that this vessel is anxious to meet you, and he supposes you
will attack her as soon as she gets 3 miles off the coast. That
this will produce a fight which will be at best a fight in waters
which may or may not be French waters, as accident may deter·
mine. That it would be offensive to the dignity of France to have
a fight under such circumstances, and France will not permit it.
That the Alabama shall not attack you, nor you her, within the
3 miles, or on or about that distance off. Under such circumstances I do not suppose that they would have, on principles of
international law, the least right to interfere with you if 3 miles
off the coast; but if you lose nothing by fighting 6 or 7 miles off
the coast instead of 3, you had best do so. You know better
than I do (who have little or no knowledge of the relative strength
of the two vessels) whether the pretence of the Alabam,a of a
readiness to meet you is more than a pretence, and I do not
wish you to sacrifice any advantage if you have it. I suggest only
that you avoid all unnecessary trouble with France; but if the
Alabama can be taken without violating any rules of international
law, and may be lost if such a principle is yielded, you know
what the Government would expect of you. You will, of course,
yield no real advantage to which you are entitled, while you are
careful to so act as to make, uselessly, no unnecessary complications with the Government. I ought to add that Mr. Seward's
dispatch, dated May 20, 1864, was in the following words : " The
Niagara will proceed with as much dispatch as possible to cruise
in European waters,· and that the Dict(J),tor, so soon as she shall
be ready for sea (which is expected to be quite soon), will follow
her, unless, in the meantime, advices from yourself and Mr.
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Adams shall be deemed to furnish reasons for a change of purpose in that respect." That you may understand exactly -the
condition of things here in regard to the Al\abama, I send you
herewith a copy of a communication from the minister of marine
of the naval prefect at Cherbourg, furnished me by the Minister
of Foreign Affairs. ( Ib~d. p. 104.)

Naval War College Discu.ssion, 1913.-In Topic I,
1913, the subject was~ "What regulations should be made
in .regard to the use in time of war of the marginal sea
and other waters?" In the discussion of 1913 it was
sajd: "In time of war there is still much difference in the
practice of states. (1913 Naval War College, Int. Law
Topics, p. 15.) Following this examples of the diversity
of practice were given. It was shown that the Institute
of _International Law had in 1894 and in 1912 proposed
6 miles as the limit of the marginal sea. The Government of the United States in 1896 indicated that it would
" not be indisposed to consider the adoption of a 6-mile
limit and in 1913 it was said " The present tendency as
sho,vn in international conferences is to extend the
limits of maritime jurisdiction " and the drift was before
1914 to,vard a 6-mile limit.
Waters adjacent to the 3-mile limdt.-It has long been
recognized that for certain purposes a littoral state may
exercise jurisdiction beyond the 3-mile lin1it. In early
tjmes clai1ns to such authority were very extended.
While exclusive claims over the 'vater area adjacent to
the 3-Inile limit have been abandoned, there has been a
general admission that the needs and safety of the neighboring state may sanction the exercise of certain powers
in the high sea adjacent to its marginal sea.
One o:f the most common grounds of the exercise of
jurisdiction outside the marginal sea is for the enforcen1ent of custo1ns regulations and the prevention of sn1uggling. La,vs upon this subject 'vere enacted by nearly
all mariti1ne states. The states n1.aintainecl that if they
had the right to regulate commerce within their ports
and coasts and to enforce regulations, it was necessary
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to exercise authority at considerable distances from the
coasts. These laws in regard to the enforcement of
customs have gradually become better 'defined and in
some instances have been repealed.
Special legislation for other purposes such as sanitation, safety of life at sea, etc., has been regarded as essential by some states.
Attitude of United States.-In a letter from Mr. Bayard, Secretary of State, to Mr. Manning, Secretary of
the Treasury, May 28, 1886, it was stated that for the
United States"\Ve 1nay, therefore, regard it as settled * * * that so far
as concerns the eastern coast of North An1erica, the position of
this department has uniformly been that the sovereignty of the
shore does not, so far as territorial authority fs concerned, extend
beyond 3 miles from low-water mark, and that the seaward
boundary of this zone of territorial waters follows the coast of
the mainland, extendjng where there are islands so as to place
round such islands the same belt. This necessarily excludes
the position that the seaward boundary is to be drawn frmn
headland to headland, and makes it follow closely, at a distance
of 3 miles, the boundary of the shore of the continent or of
adjacent islands belonging to the continental sovereign.
The position I here state, you must remember, was not taken
by this department speculatively. It ·was advanced in periods
when the question of peace or war hung on the decision. When,
during the three earlier administrations, we were threatened on
our coast by Great Britain and France, war being imminent with
Great Britain, and for a time actually though not formally engaged in with France, we asserted this line as determining the
extent of our territorial waters. When we were involved, in the
earlier part of Mr. Jefferson's administration, in difficulties with
Spain, we then told Spain that we conceded to her, so far as
concerned Cuba, the same limit of territorial waters as we claimed
for ourselves, granting nothing more; and this limit ·was afterwards reasserted by Mr. Seward during the late Civil War, when
there was every inducement on our part not only to oblige Spain
but to extend, for our own use as a belligerent, territorial privileges. (1 Wharton, Int. Law Digest, p. 107.)

In 1902 in the hearing on the arbitration of whaling
and sealing claims at The Hague, Mr. Herbert H. D.
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Pierce, Assistant Secretary of State and delegate o:f the
United States, on July 4 said:
In the first session the arbitrator asked me, "What is the extent of jurisdiction which the United States claim to-day in
Bering Sea?" and I replied that the American Government now
clahns an extent of 3 miles. I wished that this reply might be
sustained by the Secretary of State, Mr. John Hay. I am now
in receipt of a dispatch, and in accordance with the authority
which I have received from the Secretary of State of the United
States, dated July 3, 1902, I repeat that the Government of the
United States claims, neither in Bering Sea nor in its other bordering waters, an extent of jurisdiction greater than a marine
league from its shores, but bases its claims to jurisdiction upon
the following pr;nciple: The Government of the United States
clailns and admits the jurisdiction of any State over its Territorial waters only t..,o the extent of a marine league, unless a different rule is fixed by treaty between two States; even then the
treaty States alone are affected by the agreement. (1902 Foreign
Relations Appendix 1, p. 440.)

Navigation la~ws of the UnitefJ State s.-As early as
1790 the United States passed laws in regard to the enforcement of its customs regulations. (1 U. S. Stat.
145.) The tariff act of the United States of September
21, 1922, provides for the exercise of authority for customs purposes up to 4 leagues from the coast and other
states have similar legislation as in the codes o£ several
of the South American and European states.
The safety of navigation has led to the enactment of
many laws under which authority for the purpose specified was to be exercised outside the 3-mile belt. The act
of Congress of the United States of February 19, 1895,
was of this character.
1

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of Am,erica in Congress a8sembled, That on and

after lVIarch first, eighteen hundred and ninety-five, the provisions
of sections forty-two hundred and thirty-three, forty-four hundred
and twelve, and forty-four hundred and thirteen of the Revised
Statutes and regulations pursuant thereto shall be followed on
the harbors, rivers, and inland waters of the United States.
The provisions of said sections of the Revised Statutes and
re~ulations pursuant thereto are hereby declared special ruJes
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duly made by local authority relative to the navigation of harbors,
rivers, and inland waters as provided for in article thirty, of the
act of August· nineteenth, • eighteen hundred·,. · and ninety, entitled
''An act to adopt regulations for preventing co~lisions at sea."
SEc. 2. The Secretary of the Treasury is hereby authorized,
e1upowered, and directed from time to time to designate and define
by suitab,le bearings or ranges with lighthouses, light vessels.
buoys, or coast objects, the lines dividing the high seas from rivers]
harbors, and inland waters.
SEc. 3. Collectors or other chfef officers of the customs shall
l'equire a,ll sail vessels to be furnished with proper signal lights.
Every such vessel that shall be navigated without complying with
the Statutes of the United States, or the regulations that may be
lawfully made thereunder, shall be liab~e to a penalty of two
hundred dollars, one-half to go td the informer; for which sum
the vessel so navigated shal,l be liable, and may be seized and
proceeded against by way of . libel in any district court of the
United States having jurisdiction of the offense.
SEc. 4. The words "inland waters" used in this act shall not be
held to include the Great Lakes and their connecting and tributary
waters as far east as Montreal ; and this act shall not in any
respect modify or affect the provisions of the act entitled "An act
to regulate navigation on the Great Lakes and their connecting
and tributary waters," approved February eighth, eighteen hundred and ninety-five.
Approved, February 19, 1895. (28 U. S. Stat. p. 672.) ,

Under the above act lines were established along the
coast of the United States at some points more than 8
miles beyond the low-water mark. These lines at times
were within the 3-mile limit and usually terminated at
designated marks on shore or at buoys, lightships, or
lighthouses, thus having little or no relation to the marginal sea as accepted in international law.'
Interpretation of act of 1895.-In 1899 ·a case arose involving the act o£ February 19, 1895, and raising question
of liability in case of an accident in which it was argued
that an accident within the limits o£ a line established
under the act of 1895 would be within the jurisdiction
of the United States.
In this case through an accident, Carlson was killed by
a boat belonging to the respondents and Judge Brown
said:
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As the maritime law gives no action for death caused by
neg,Ugence on the high seas (The Harrisburg, 119 U. S. 199, 7
Sup. Ct. 140), this action can rest only upon the State statute;
and to make that applicable the negligence, or the death, or
both, must happen within the jurisdiction of the State. The
location of the accident according to the weight of evidence,
seems to me clearly more than a marine league, or 3 miles,
from any part of the shores of the State of New York or New
Jersey; nor is there any manner of drawing lines from headland to headland, except as be1ow stated by which this location could be brought intra fauces terrae. Under the act of
Congress, however, approved February 19, 1895 (28 Stat. 672),
having reference to the regulations for preventing collisions at
~ea and authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to designate and
define the lands dividing the high seas from rivers, harbors, and
inland waters, the Secretary drew a line extending from Navesink
Lighthouse NE. % E. about 41;2 miles to the Scotland light
vessel, which is 3 miles from the nearest shore on Sandy Hook,
and thence NNE. 1;2 E. through the Gedney Channel whistling
buoy to Rockaway Point Life Saving Station on the Long Island
shore. The accident occurred undoubtedly to the westward of that
line. Even if this line was a couple of miles beyond the usually
recognized limit of 3 miles from a shore, it is contended that the
line thus established by the Secretary of the Treasury wou,ld be
valid as an assertion of the exclusive jurisdiction of the United
States as against other nations, because this extension seaward is
undoubtedly less than the range of our modern shore batteries
(see Pon1. I nt. Law, § § 144, 150; Wheat. Int. Law, 177) and any
such extension by the United States, it is urged, extends pari
passu the jurisdiction and boundaries of the State as its necessary
incident. In the case of Bigelow v. Nickerson, 17 C. C. A. 1, '/0
Fed. 113, however, to which reference on this point is made, the
question had reference to the State jurisdiction over the waters
of Lake Michigan and was quite different from the present; since
there the acts establishing the boundaries of the State expressly
included the waters of the lake. In that case, moreover, it was
assumed that upon the ocean the State jurisdiction extends but
a 1narine league from shore. (See also Manchester v. Massachu&etts, 139 U. S. 240, 11 Sup. Ct. 559.) But I doubt whether in
fixing the line as above indicated, the Secretary of the Treasury
intended to pass beyond the limit of a marine league, the usually
accepted boundary. The Scotland lightship does not exceed that
distance from shore, and if from that vessel a line be drawn to a
point 1 1narine league south of the western end of Rockaway
Beach, that line will pass through the whistling buoy; so that the
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Secretary's line seems to agree accurately with the old rule of
jurisdiction, and the accident would be found to be within the
State limits. (Carlson v. United New York Sandy Hook Pilots
Asso~iation (1899), 93 Federal Reporter, p. 468.)

The accident was found to be due to the negligence of
fellow servants. The libel was dismissed.
So in this case the action was settled on other grounds;
but the conclusion is, from the above decision, that the act
of February 19, 1895, was not intended to, and did not,
ehange the old rule of jurisdiction extending a marine
league off shore.
Russo-Japanese War, 190/r.-Cases arising in the
l{usso-Japanese War, 1904, showed a clear recognition
that jurisdiction of the coastal state in time of war is
limited to three miles. In the case of the Rossia, a Russian merchant vessel, captured February 7, 1904, 6 miles
off the coast of l(orea, the Sasebo Prize Court said:
The limit of territorial waters generally recognized by existing
international Jaw is 3 nautical miles from the coast. Therefore
the capture of this vessel at sea, 6 nautical miles from Kushingham, Corea, was a capture on the high seas, and in no way
unlawful. (2 Hurst and Bray, Russian and Japanese Prize
Cases, p. 39.)

Similarly in the case of the Michael, a Russian deep
sea fishing vessel, captured 51f2 miles off the coast of
Korea, the Sasebo Prize Court said:
It can not be denied that the Michael was an enemy vessel, and
that her capture took place after the commencement of host~lities.
Further, the place of capture was 51h nautical miles from the
Corean coast, and since the international law regards territorial
waters as not extending beyond 3 nautical miles from the shore,
the vessel's capture took place on the high seas. (Ibid. p. 80.) ,
/

Hague rules on maritilme war--There had been for
many years wide differences of opinion concerning rights
and duties of neutral powers in maritime war. A convention bearing the title, " Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Maritime War" was drawn up at The Hague
in 1907 and has been generally accepted. According to
its preamble the aim of the Convention, XIII Hague,
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'vas to harmonize the relations which should exist be·tween belligerents and neutrals in time of war. The
articles relating particularly to territorial waters were
the first three, as :follows :
ARTICLE 1

Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral
powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters,
from all acts which would constitute, on the part of the neutral
powers ,,·hich knowingly permitted them, a nonfulfihuent of their
neutrality.
ARTICLE 2

.AJl acts of hostility, including capture and the exercise of the
right of visit and search, committed by belligerent vessels of war
in the territorial waters of a neutral power, constitute a violation
of neutrality and are strictly forbiduen.
ARTICLE 3

"\Vhen a ship has been captured in the territorial waters of a
neutral power, this power must, if the prize is still within its
jurisdiction, employ the means at its disposal to release the prize
with its officers and crew, and to intern the prize crew.
If the prize is not within the, jurisdiction of the neutral power,
the captor government, on the demand of that power, must liberate the prize with its officers and crew.

In the Second Peace Con:ference at The Hague (the
same con:ference) the :following comment was made upon
Article I:
"It has sometimes been asked if there is any occasion to distinguish between ports and territorial waters. The distinction
is comprehensible as to what concerns the duty of the neutral,
who can not be responsible in the same degree for what happens
in his territorial wat~rs, over which he often has only a feeble
control, as for what takes place in the ports subject to his immediate authority. The distinction is not recognized as to the duty
of the belligerent, wh:ch is the same everywhere." (Deux. Conf.
Int. de la Paix, vol. I, p. 298.)

In ratification by the Senate o:£ the United States, it
was stated that this was voted-
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"With the understanding that the last clause of article 3 of the
said convention implies the duty of a neutral power to make the
demand therein n1entioned for the return of a ship captured within
the neutral jurisdiction and no longer within that jurisdiction."
(Proclamation by the President, Feb. 28, 1909.)

Articles 25 and 26 providedART. 2·5. A neutral power is bound to exercise such surveillance
as the means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation of the
provisions of the above articles occurring in its ports or roadsteads
or in its waters.
ART. 26. The exercise by a neutral power of the rights laid
down in the present convention can under no circumstances be
considered as an unfriendly act by one or the other belligerent
who has accepted the article relating thereto.

Doctor W ehberg'8 co1nment.-Doctor W ehberg writing
before the World \Var. said of the Hague Convention
XIII:
The right of prize can, of course, only be exercised outside
neutral waters, as is expressly laid down in article 1 of the
-"Agreement touching the rights and duties of neutrals in case
of naval war." No decision as to which waters are to be regarded
as neutral has been arrived at, so that the old international disputes on this point still continue.
While this latter article is only meant as "The expression of
the dominating idea of this portion of international law," (Prot.
I., p. 297; III., p. 572) article 2 of the agreement gives a special
decision as to neutral coasts: "All hostilities committed by warships of belligerents within coastal waters of a neutral power,
including seizure and the exercise of the right of search form a
breach of neutrality, and are unconditionally forbidden." In case
of action in contravention of this, article 3 lays down the following: "If a ship has been captured within the coastal waters of
a neutral power, that power must, in so far as the prize is still
within its sovereignty employ all the means at its disposal to
bring about the release of the prize with her officers and crew, and
to hold captive the prize crew placed on board her by the captor.
Should the prize be beyond the bounds of its sovereignty, the capturing Government must release the prize, with officers and crew,
at the demand of th:at power." (Wehberg, Capture in War on
Land and Sea, p. 62.)
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Russia, 191f8.-A dispatch £rom the American ambassa-

dor to Russia on February 3, 1912, referring to the laws
of the years immediately preceding said :
Russia proposes ultimately to extend her control in every way
to a distance of 12 miles from all her coasts bordering on the
ocean. This has not yet been fully accomplished, but only in part.
The question naturally groups itself into three divisions:
1. The exercise of customs authority to a distance of 12 miles
from all her coasts on the open sea.
This law was approved by the Emperor, December 10/23, 1909,
promulgated January 1/14, 1910, and is now in force. As yet,
so far as can be ascertained, no case calling for special international protest bas occurred under it.
.
2. The extension of Russian jurisdiction over all open-sea fisheries on the Pacific coasts within 12 miles of the lands of the
Russian Empire.
This law was passed May 29/June 11, 1911, and went into
force December 25/January 7, last.
3. The law extending jurisdiction over fisheries conducted in
the White Sea and within 12 miles of the Archangel Government
was reported favorably by the committee to the Duma last June,
but has not yet been passed. It lies on the table and it is reported that English influence is responsible for the delay in its
passage.
England has formally protested against all three of these laws
in particular and against the attitude of Russia in general in
regard to the extension of jurisdiction from 3 miles to 12. Not
being, however, specially interested in the Pacific coast fisheries,
Eng,land has confined vigorous action to the Archangel and White
Sea fisheries, where her interests are large. England hopes to
be able to get this proposed law postponed long enough to permit
the matter to be presented before the next Hague Conference in
1915. The President of the Duma has assured the British ambassador that the project can not be reached by the present Duma,
and lVI. Sazonov practically admitted the same thing to me.
Japan also has protested in general against the whole proposition of extension of jurisdiction to 12 miles from shore in the
open sea, but she has confined her vigorous action to the fisheries
in the Pacific, where her direct interests are enormous. The
annua,l Japanese catch of fish in what are now clailned to be
Russian waters is valued in gross by the Japanese Embassy at
80,000,000 rubles.
Japan contends that the section of these laws dealing with
Pacific fisheries is not only in violation of international .law, but is
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nlso a violation of the spirit of the existing Russo-Japanese fishery agreement.
Two Japanese delegates representing the fishing fleet of Japan
are now here seeking a1nelioration of present conditions.
The Japanese Embassy fi.led a formal note of protest on October
31 last in regard to Russia's action in the Pacific fisheries, but
as yet has received no answer.
The item mentioned by you from the American press of December 13 in regard to the abandonment by Russia of this policy is an
error.
On the contrary, M. Sazonov in a long interview last night
assured me that Russia proposed to maintain the 12-mile limit
as a pennanent policy, though he hinted that it might be modified
in detail, and frankly stated that Russia had agreed to hold
conversations with the representatives of Japan and of England,
especia,l ly on the points in which the two countries were respectively interested.
Russia contends that the 3-mile limit is obsolete. The distance
of 3 Iniles having been set as the conventional range of a cannon,
it is claimed that with the extension of the range of modern
ordnance the limit of jurisdiction should be increased to corre.suond. (1912 For. Rel., p. 1304.)

Attitude of Governonents, 1914-1918.-The "\Vorld War
made it necessary for many States to pronounce what limits they proposed to fix for their territorial waters as
regards belligerent and neutral rights.
In a decree of November 5, 1914, Chile statedIt is decreed :
The contiguous sea, up to a distance o{ 3 marine miles counted
from the ,low-water line, is considered as the jurisdictional or neutral sea on the coasts of the Republic for the safeguarding of the
rights and the accomplishment of the duties relative to the neutrality declared by the Government in case of international conflicts. (1916 Naval War College, Int. Law Topics, p. 19.)

Subsequently, a decree prescribed that the interior
'waters of the Straits of Magellan, "Even in the parts
which are distant more than 3 miles from either bank
should be considered as forming part of the jurisdictional
or neutral sea." (Ibid. p. 21.)
The Netherlands, which had brought the matter of a
6-mile limit to the atten6on of the United States in 1896,
44003--29--3
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and to which Secretary Olney had replied he would " not
be indisposed " to consider such a limit, in its declaration
of neutrality of August 5, 1914, stated:
ART. 4. No warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging to
any of the belligerents shall have access to the said territory.

*

*

*

*

13. It is forbidden, in State territory, to equip, arm, or
man vesse,ls intended for military purposes on behalf of a belligerent, or to furnish or deliver such vessels to a belligerent.
ART. 14. It is forbidden, in State territory to supply arms or
ammunition to warships or ships assimilated thereto belonging
to a belligerent, or to come to their assistance in any manner
whatsoever with a view to aug1nent their crew or their -equipment.
ART. 15. It is forbidden in State territory failing previous authorization by the competent local autho;l.'ities, t o repair warships
or ships assimilated thereto belonging to a belligerent, or to supply them with victuals or fuel.
ART. 16. It is forbidden in State territory to take part in the
dismantling or repairing of prizes, except. in so far as. is necessary
to n1ake them seaworthy; also to purchase prizes or confiscated
goods and to receive them in exchange, in gift, or on deposit.
ART. 17. The State territory comprises the coastal waters to a
distance of 3 nautical miles, reckoning 60 to the degree of latitude, from low-water mark. (Ibid. p. 63.)
ART.

Uruguay decreed on August 7, 1914--ART. 2. In accordance with the principle established by the
treaty of lVIontevideo in 1889 (Penal Law, art. 12) , and with
the principles generally accepted in these matters, the waters
will be considered as territorial waters to a distance of 5 miles
from the coast of the mainland and islands, fro1n the visible outlying shoals, and the fixed marks which detern1ine the limit of the
banks not visible. (Ibid. p. 107.)

A Swedish decree of July 19, 1916, provided thatSubmarines belonging to foreign powers and equipped for use
in warfare may not navigate or lie in Swedish territorial waters
within 3 nautical minutes (5,556 meters) from land or frmn extreme outlying skerries, which are not continuously washed over
by the sea, under peril of being attacked by armed force without
previous warning. (1917, Naval War College, Int. Law Documents, p. 215.)
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on July 18, 1917, issued regulations fixing 3
miles as the marginal sea limit. ( 1918 Ibid. p. 116.)
On June 18, 1918, Norway issued new regulations statIng· 1. The Norwegian Govern~ent, who llave in the past claimed
that the territorial waters of Norway extend to 4 miles from the
shore, have recognized the difficulty of upholding this claim during the war, since it is not recognized by either the British or
the Ge-rman Governments.
2. The Norwegian Govern1nent accordingly intimated to His
British Majesty's Government, on ~Iay 3, 1918, that Norwegian
naval officers have now received instructions that they are to confine their efforts to maintaining the neutrality of the waters
within the 3-mile limit, and are not to fire on belligerent ships
operating outside that limit. (Ibid. p. 118.)

The li1nits of territorial waters, stated in other proc .
lamations and decrees, varied.
The United States and Italy, 1914.-A royal decree
of August 6, 1914, "for the pur poses of neutrality," fixed
the limit of Italian territorial waters at 6 nautical 1niles
and .further provided thatART. 2. In bays, bights, and gulfs, territoriaJ waters, for the
purposes set forth in the foregoing article, lie within a straight
outward line tangent to 2 circumferences with a 6-mile radius
and having their centers at the extre1ne points of the opening of
the bay, bight, or gulf; provided the dist a nce between the said
points does not exceed 20 n a utical miles ( 37,040 meters).
If the distance between the extreme points of the opening exceeds 20 nauticnl n1iles, the territorial waters ,lie within a straight
line drawn between the 2 outennost points of the bay, bight, or
gulf separated by a distance of at least 20 nautical miles." (1914
For. Rei. Sup., p. 664.)

The above action was made known to the Department
of State of the United States by the Italian Ambassador
and the receipt of the information was· acknowledged.
In a note of November 6, 1914, the Italian Ambassador
said to the Secreta~y of State :
Whether because of the fact that the limits of the marginal
sea are not reguJated by international conventions or general
rules of international law-thus leaving every state at liberty
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to fix them within the sphere of its own sovereignt;y without subjecting its decision to the recognition of the other states- or
because of the fact that no comment was made by your excellency
on the Royal Embassy's communications, His :Majesty's Government knows that no objections are made by the Fecleral Government to the 6-mile limit set by us on our territoria.l waters for
the purposes of neutrality.
Yet, with a view to removing any possible uncertainty, His
1\Iajesty's Government would be very thankful for a declaration
which would explicitly convey acceptance by the Federal Government of the decision as adopted. And, in compliance with instructions I have just received on the subject, I have the honor
to apply to your exceiiency's trie• l courtesy for such a declaration.
(Ibid. p. 665.)

On November 28, the Acting Secretary o:£ State replied:
I am compelled to inform your excellency of my inability to
accept the principle of the royal decree in so far as it may undertake to extend the limits of the territorial waters beyond 3 nautical
miles from the main shore line and to extend thereover the
jurisdiction of the Italian Government.
An examination into the question involved leads to the conclusion that the territorial jurisdiction of a nation over the waters
of the sea which wash its shore is now generally recognized by
the principal nations to extend to the distance of 1 marine league
or 3 nautical miles, that the Government of the United States
appears to have uniformly supported this rule, and that the right
{)f a nation to extend, by domestic ordinance, its jurisdiction beyond this limit has not been acquiesced in by the Government of
the United States.
There are certain reasons, brought forward from time to time
in the discussion of this question and advanced by writers on international law, why the maritime nations might deem the way
clear to extend this determined limit of 3 miles, in view of the
great improvement in gunnery and of the extended distance to
which, from the shore, the rights of nations could be defended;
but it seems manifestly important that such a construction or
change of the rule should be reduc-ed to a precise proposition and
should then receive in some manner reciprocal acknowledgement
from the principal maritime powers; in fine, that the extent of
the open or high seas should better be the result of some concerted understanding by the nations whose vessels sail them than
be left to the determination of each particular nation, influenced
.by the interests which may be peculiar to it. (Ibid. p. 666.)
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Later, on December 12, 1914, the Secretary informed
the Italian Ambassador That upon further consideration of this subject, while the department is obliged to adhere to the opinions expressed in its
note of the 28th ulthno, it has taken steps to furnish the departinent of the Navy with a copy of the diplomatic correspondence on this matter, with the request that orders be issued to the
public ships of the United States notifying the1n of the roya,l decree of August 6 last mentioned above, and giving such further
instructions as may be appropriate with a view to avoid so far
as is possible any incident which may raise a question between the
Governments of Italy and the United States as to the extent
of the territorial waters of the former country. (Ibid. p. 666.)

Hovering, 1915-16.-The correspondence between the
American and British Governments in regard to operations of British vessels of war off the coast of the United
States during the vVorld War touched upon the limits of
jurisdiction. The British maintained their right . to
cruise beyond the 3-mile limit and the State Department
said:
In reply it may be stated that the Government of the United
States advances no claim that British ves!Sels which haYe been and
are cruising off American ports beyond the 3-mile limit have not
in so doing been within their strict legal rights. under international law. The grounds for the objection of the Government
of the United States to the continued presence of belligerent
vessels of war cruising in close proxhnity to American ports are
based, not upon the illegality of such action but upon the irritation which it naturally causes to a neutral country. (Spec. Sup.
10 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, p. 384.)

The "Elida.''-The German Imperial Supreme Court
in Berlin in 1915 had before it a case involving the extent
of maritime jurisdiction in ti1ne of war. In the discussion of the case of the Elida, May 18, 1915, the court
said:
It is true that a considerable nu1nber of States have extended
by national law their territorial jurisdiction beyond the 3-mile
limit, either generally or with regard to certain legal , rights.
This particularly applies to Sweden and Norway, which extended
their national waters to a distance of 4 1niles. A number of

32

MARITIME JURISDICTION

other States even went 1nuch further in this respect. But a special
international title, valid in relation to the German Empire, and
therefore to be taken into account by the prize court, does not
exist, for up to the present time the Swedish claim has been recognized only by the Norwegian Government. According to official
information from the German Foreign Office, Germany especially
in the course of the discussions concerning this matter which
took place in 1874, did not accept Sweden's point of view but
treated the question of national waters as an open one, while
England ins:sted upon the 3-mile limit. Similarly in 1897, when
the Swedish Government addressed a communication to the German Legation at Stockholm concerning the fishery jurisdiction,
the German Government restricted itself to raising no objection
against Sweden's claim to a 4-mile bo_undary for the fishery and
the question of the neutralization of this marine area in case of
war was not thereby affected. * * *
Heretofore the maritime boundary of States has been generally
recognized in theory and practice as being 3 nautical miles distance
from the coast. Originally it was based on the carrying distance,
corresponding to the gunnery technique of those times, of ships
and coast guns. It is true that nowadays this reason is no longer
applicab~ e.
Here, however, the axiom cessante ratione non cessat
lex ipsa applies, and although numerous proposals and opinions
have been put forward with regard to a different delimitation of
the national waters, it can not be asserted that any other method
has in practice met with the general concurrence of the maritime
States. * * *
Furthermore, it must be remembered that even if the exercise
by a maritime nation of certain official functions, such as those of
the health and customs authorities, is tolerated beyond the 3-mile
zone, this by no means represents a concession to the effect that
in all other respects the w aters in question are included within the
territorial jurisdiction. * * *
The British Go-vernment during the negotiations in the year
1911 with regard to the holding of an international congress for
the regulation of the question of coastal waters, decidedly adhered
to the 3-mile zone; and, accordingly, even in the present war, it
had Admiral Craddock inform the Government of Urugua.y that
it would not recognize thb claims of Uruguay and Argentina to
an extension of the territoria( waters beyond the 3-mile zone.
It can, therefore, be still less assumed that this boundary has been
supplanted by another generally acknowledged international regulation. (Translation, 10 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, p. 916; 1 Entscbeidungen des Oberprisengerichts [1915], No. 9.)
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"Bangor."-In the case o£ the Bamgor, a Norwegian vessel captured on the ground o£ unneutral service in the Straits o£ Magellan, March 14, 1915, the question o£ the jurisdiction of neutral waters was raised.
The British prize court passed upon this case on May
30, 1916, and said, as to the waters o£ a neutral State:
Upon the assumption made for the purposes of this case that
the Bangor was in fact captured within the territorial waters
of a neutral, the question is whether the vessel was immune from
legal capture and its consequences according to the law of nations. In other words, can the owners of the vessel, who are,
ex hypothesi, to be treated as enemies, rely upon the territorial
rights of a neutral State and object to the capture? Or must the
objection to the validity of the capture come from the neutral
State alone?
No proposition in international law is clearer or more surely
established thnn that a capture within the territorial waters of a
neutral State is, as between enemy belligerents. for all pur poses
rightful, and that it is only by the neutral State concerned that
the legal validity of the capture can be questioned. * * *
Assuming for the purpose of this judgment that Convention
XIII is binding, it is clear that the convention was only directed
to the relations between neutral powers and bell: gerent powers,
and was only intended to apply to questions arising between neu tral powers and belligerent powers as such. Its provisions were
not intended to deal with any question between belligerents, and
did not affect the rule relating to capture in territorial waters of
a neutral State as between two belligerent powers, where the neutral State did not intervene.
For these reasons I decide that the objection made by the claimants to the validity of the capture, even if it took place in neutral
territorial waters, is not well founded, and I disallow the claim
with costs. ( [1916] P. 181; 5 Lloyd's Prize Oases, p. 308.)

Treaties.-The treaties concluded with a view to making effective the provisions o£ legislation of the United
States in regard to the smuggling of intoxicating liquors
are of two categories. One group o£ treaties recognizes
the 3-mile limit and another group leaves the matter
without prejudice.
In the treaties of the United States with Great Britain,
,January 23, 1924 (43 U. S. Stat., pt. 2, p. 1761); Cuba,
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March 4, 1926 ( 44 U. S. Stat., pt. 3, p. 2395) ; Germany, May 19, 1924 (43 U. S. Stat., pt. 2, p. 1815}
The Netherlands, August 21, 1924 ( 44 U. S. Stat., pt.
3, p. 2013) ; and Panama, June 6, 1924 ( 43 U. S. Stat.,
pt. 2, p. 187 5), the provisions o:f Article I made pro~
nouncement similar to the following :
The High Contracting Parties declare that it is their firm
intention to uphold the principle that 3 marine miles extending
from the coastline outward and measured from low-water mark
constitute the proper limits of territorial waters.

'rhe corresponding article with certain other states
reads as follo·ws :
The High Contracting Parties, respectively, retain their rights
and claims, without prejudice by reason of this agreement, with
respect to the extent of their territorial jurisdiction. Belgium
(U. S. Treaty Series, No. 759, Dec. 9, 1925) ; Denmark, 1\Iay 29,
1924 ( 43 Stat. pt. 2, p. 1809) ; France (U. S. Treaty Series, No.
755, June 30, 1924) ; Italy, June 3, 1924 ( 43 Stat. pt. 2, p. 1844) ;
Norway, lVIay 24, 1924 ( 43 Stat. pt. 2, p. 1772) ; Spain omits
"and claims", Feb. 10, 1926 ( 44 Stat., pt. 3, p. 2465) ; and
Sweden, 1\fay 22, 1924 ( 43 Stat., pt. 2, p. 1830).

O:pinion of St~pre1n,e Oourt.-On April 30, 1923, the
Supreme Court of the United States said: " It now is
settled in the United States and recognized elsewhere that
the territory subject to its jurisdiction includes the land
areas under its dominion and control, the ports, harbors,
bays, and other inclosed arms of the sea along its coast,
and a marginal belt of the sea extending from the coast
line outward a n1arine league, or 3 geographic miles."
(Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon ( 1923) 262 U. S. 100.)
OentJ~ai l An~erican Court of JttJstice, 1917.-In the case
between the Republic of El Sal vaclor and the Republic
of Nicaragua decided March 9, 1917, referring to the GuLf
of Fonseca, the court said:
The theory that the high party defendant accepts as the true
test of the territoriality of the gulf is one that must be examined
in the light of the distances traced on the 1uaps, because they give
an idea of the real, or at least probable, extent of the gulf. The
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geographer Squier fixes it approximately at 50 miles in length by
30 in width. The technical study by the engineers Barberena and
Alcaine declares the existence of two zones in which, according
to the law of nations and the internal laws of the riparian
States, they may exercise their jurisdiction, to wit, the zone of 1
marine league contiguous to the coasts, wherein the jurisdiction
is absolute and exclusive, and the further zone of 3 marine
leagues, wherein they may exercise the right of imperium for
defensive and fiscal purposes. (11 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, pp. 674,

wa>
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British attitude, 1923.-ln reply to a question as to the
Russian claim to a 12-mile zone for fishing rights, the
Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs said, April
30, 1923:
The doctrine of territorial waters is not laid down in any international instrument, but the jurisdiction of nations over their
coastal waters has been accepted by usage and is now a recognized rule of international law; His Majesty's Government have
always 1naintained that by international law and practice the
general lin1it of territorial jurisdiction is 3 miles, but from time
to time claims to extend the 3-mile limit have been advanced by
different States. Such claims, which amount to annexation of the
high seas, could only be made effective by international agreement. (163 House of Commons Debates, 5 s., p. 961.)

The "Fagernes."-On March 17, 1926, a collision in
the Bristol Channel occurred 10112 or 12¥2 miles off the
English coast and 9¥2 or 7% miles off the Welsh coast.
In this collision the steamship F ({gernes was sunk and
the steamship Oornish Coast was damaged. The lower
court held that the collision occurred within British
jurisdiction and the case was then brought to the court
of appeal and it was argued that the part of the Bristol
Channel in question was within the pilotage district,
and therefore within the sovereignty of Great Britain.
The Attorney General in response to a request from the
court said that he had been instructed by the Secretary
of State for Hom.e Affairs to say thatThe spot where this co~Jision is alleged to have occurred is not
within the limits to which the territorial sovereignty of His
Majesty extends. ( [1927] P. 311, 319, C. A.)
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In the opinion o£ Bankes L. J. it is stated that in international law writers and jurists do not agree in their
opinions as to the extent o£ territorial waters. Lawrence
L. J. in agreeing that the waters where the collision took
place were not withjn British jurisdiction said:
It is common ground that there is no international treaty or
convention expressly sanctioning or recogniz~ng any territorial
rights of the Crown over the Bristol Channel. Further, no evidence has been adduced that the Crown has. possessed itself of;
or has effectively asserted any territorial rights over, that part
of the Bristol Channel where the collision occurred. In the absence of any express t r eaty or controlling executive act of the
Govern1nent, the question arises whether there is any established
general rule of jnternational law for determining the territorial
character of bays. The consideration of this question has. occupied the g reater part of the hearing both in the court below and
in this court.
The Attorney General, in the cqurse of his able argument, has
cited and commented upon the opinion of jurists, the practice of
nations and the relevant judicial decisions. I do not propose to
deal \v:th these sources of information in detail, but content myself by saying that in my judgn1ent the Attorney General has
established the proposition that, although the principle of claim~
ing terr itorial rights over bays is well established as a rule of
international law, and although there is no question as to the
applica bility of that pr:nciple in the case of bays, the entire land
boundaries of which form part of the territory of the same state
and the entrances. of which do not exceed 6 sea miles in width,
yet there is no recognized general rule of international law by
which it can be determined whether any given bay, with an entrance wider than 6 sea miles, does. or does not form part of the
terr itory of the State whose shores form its land boundary. Each
such case must depend upon its own special circumstances. (Ibid.
311, 327.)

Some o£ the early contentions of Great Britain were
not in accord with this decision. Some of the judges of
the court of appeal testified they would have agreed with
the judgment of the lower court if they had been sitting·
·with similar evidence before them. There was, however,
a plain statement of the Government and decision in accord with it that these waters were not \vithin British
jurisdiction. Lord Justice Bankes stated that the reply
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o:f the Crown, though given at the instance o:f the court
and :for the information o:£ the court, did not in his opinion " necessarily bind the court in the sense that it is
under an obligation to accept it."
High sea and nationallegisla(ion.-The rights o:f states
in the high seas are novv regarded as :fundamental.
Fundamental rights are never renounced by states without express and clearly intended act as by an international convention or by a proclamation, e. g., Panama by
the convention o:£ 1903 grants to the United States "all
the rights, power, and authority within the zone which
the United States would possess and exercise i:f it were
sovereign." Pana1na does not renounce or grant sovereignty and the United States pays $250,000 per year to
Panama " as the price or compensation :for the rights,
powers, and privileges granted in this convention.'~
The :freedom o:£ the sea outside the 3-mile limit is a
generally recognized right which no single state may
limit. Laws enacted by certain states sometimes seen1
to be contrary to international law but courts have regularly held that such a construction of the law ought not
to be admitted. In the case o:f the Charming Betsey,
1804, Chief Justice Marshall, in referring to neutra1
rights said:
It has also been observed that an act of Congress ought never to
oe construed to violate the law of nations if any other pqssible
construction remains, and consequently can never be construed to
violate neutral rights, or to affect neutral commerce, further than
is warranted by the law of nations as understood in this country.
( 2 Cranch Reports, Supreme Court, p. 64.)

In an earlier decision Chief Justice Marshall admitted
that"The laws of the United States ought not, if it be avoidable,
so to be construed as to infract the common principles and usages
of nations, or the general doctrines of national law." (Talbot v.
Seeman, 1801, 1 Cranch Reports, Supreme Court, p. 1.)

Other states have taken the same attitude in regard
to domestic legislation affecting rights on the high sea.

38

MARITIME JURISDICTION

In international communications and agreements the
United States has :for many years upheld the 3-mile
limit as the extent o:f territorial waters.
Such recent internatj_onal agreement as that relating to
the Aaland Islands, October 20, 1921, states thatThe territorial waters of the Aaland Islands are considered to
extend for a distance of 3 marine miles from the low-water 1nark
on the islands, islets, and reefs not permanently submerged.

In general it may be maintained that the right o:f a
state to protect itsel:f and to be secure is :fundamental and
this is not lessened because other states engage in war,
e. g., retaliation even should not in time o:f war be aimed
at neutrals though neutrals may be indirectly injured by
retaliation. Belligerents do not by their declaration o:f
war acquire rights to injure neutrals, e. g., Alabarrna and
K ears:arrge, 1864, of which l\1r .. Bayard said in 1886, " We
claim also that the sovereign· of the shore has the right,
on the principle of sel:f de:fense to pursue and punish marauders on the sea to the very extent to which their guns
would carry their shot, and that such sovereign has jurisdiction over crimes committed by them through such
shot, although at the time of the shooting they were beyond 3 miles :from the shore." (Letter to Mr. Manning,
Secretary o:f ·Treasury, 1 Moore, p. 721.) A state may
also determine the conditions o:f entrance or even prohibit
the entrance o:f vessels of war both in time o:f peace and
in time of war, e. g., the Netherlands, declaration of neutrality, August 5, 1914.
SOLUTION

(a) (1) The right o:f visit and search beyond the 3mile limit upon the high sea is an undeniable belligerent
right and the authorities o:f the United States can afford
no protection against its la w:ful exercise.
(2) The protest o:f the Oygnet is not valid, as these
·waters are not, :for the purposes o:f neutrality, within the
jurisdiction o:f the lJnited States.
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(b) The authorities of the United States may use the
means at their disposal to prevent the diffusion of dangerous gas within 3 miles of the coast.
(c) The authorities of the United States may exclude
from its harbors vessels having dangerous gas on board,
or may prescribe the conditions of entrance thereto for
such vessels.

